Chapter 1 - Mission and Values
1.1§ Ecosystem
Own The Doge refers to The Doge NFT ecosystem, collectively owned by DOG and Doge Pixel holders. This ecosystem includes its decentralised governance structures, tools, treasury, applications, IP and social presence.
“Community”, “Token Holder” and “DAO” are used interchangeably.
1.2§ Power
Any and all power vested in Own The Doge originates from the token holders (and Atsuko!). Influence over governance is exercised by any person or entity holding DOG and Doge Pixels. The process of this power is explained in Section 2.
1.3§ Values
Own The Doge is built upon the concepts of trust-minimization and decentralisation. Own The Doge shall continuously strive towards improving governance structures, functions, and systems to minimise, and when possible exclude, the need for trust in individual persons and organisations.
Chapter 2 - Governance
While Own The Doge is based on provenance, the DAO has come into ownership of the intellectual property of the original Doge image. With it comes the responsibility of respecting the wishes of Atsuko Sato and the memory of Kabosu. It is important that the official brand and image remain wholesome and well-regarded. This means not corrupting ideals with capital, and rejecting opportunities that would compromise this mission.
Atsuko, regardless of any token holdings, has full veto power over all decisions. This does not mean she has to be actively involved with, or even have knowledge of, all decisions. If there is any uncertainty about executing something that impacts the brand and/or image, she should be asked her opinion.
Below is a graphic representing our governance structure:
2.1§ Token holder governance
Token holders collectively have control over all operations and assets in the ecosystem. This control is explicitly signalled through snapshot voting decisions. These decisions are then executed by the multisig.
At the time of the snapshot, holders are granted voting weight based on how many DOG tokens and pixels they hold. One pixel is equal to ~55,240 DOG tokens, as this is how much DOG it costs to create one.
Token holders delegate and entrust operations to the DIC. This includes management of employees and the consideration of all forum proposals. Anyone is allowed to create a proposal on the forums.
Snapshot votes are created and started by the multisig, on behalf of either the community or DIC. All votes last one week.
Votes must be communicated publicly, through channels such as discord, telegram and twitter. This is the responsibility of the DIC.
2.2§ Doge Improvement Council
The DIC consists of a community-elected council with delegated power to promote and forward projects that are beneficial for the interests of the ecosystem. It should generally be able to move fast and not be mired in bureaucracy. All members are equal in their power and may decide an internal structure amongst themselves, unless otherwise instructed by the DAO.
The DIC consists of 5 representatives. Their term length is 24 months, unless a DIC member decides to resign at an earlier time or is removed by community vote. Any decision made by the DIC requires a majority of representatives.
The DIC is responsible for expanding the ecosystem and furthering the mission of Own The Doge.
2.2.1§ DIC Representatives
DIC representatives are elected by token holder vote. They may additionally be rewarded as contributors by the DAO, typically in a role that oversees a part of the management of the business of OTD, such as merchandise or marketing. The DIC may recommend contributors and pay structures for the approval of the DAO (or token representative by extension). DIC members must stay in tune with the community by participating on Discord, Twitter, Discourse, and other platforms.
DIC representatives must attend at least one weekly call.
2.2.2§ Voting Rights
DIC representatives are responsible for approving decisions, usually by vote in our internal Slack channel.
The DIC can vote on and execute any proposal, regardless of notional size, as long as it is agreed to by the token representative. The token representative must be aware of all spending.
2.2.3§ Special roles
To enable the efficient flow of operations, we have two special functional roles within the DIC. These roles cannot be shared by the same person. They are elected as every other role is in 2.2.4. They are DIC members, part of the 5 elected members, and are not in addition to this number.
Communicator to Atsuko
Atsuko currently requires a translator to communicate with the DAO. She then communicates through a single appointed DIC spokesperson. This makes sense so as to not overwhelm her. This member should be recommended by the DIC to the DAO, and then elected each two years. A good personal relationship with one member and Atsuko creates a strong foundation for our work. This person is required to relay their communications to the DIC, so that they can verify there are no conflicts of interest and that everything is being communicated faithfully and accurately. However, the DIC will not ask for recordings or transcripts of entire conversations as we believe this would be an overreach on her privacy.
Atsuko does not fully understand all of our operations regarding blockchain technology and decentralisation - so it is important to understand that she could be misled if this responsibility is not well handled. The translator, who must be present for all communication anyway, is required to remain neutral so that communications can be independently verified if needed. The translator should not be part of the DIC, and is a mandatory expense.
Token Representative
This representative must either themselves hold a significant portion of the supply (enough to swing any given vote in their favour), or has been delegated this power by the token holders through a snapshot vote. This allows the representative to pass over-threshold proposals with the trust of the community, without repeatedly having to submit to the full governance process and wait times. It is important to do this to ensure the efficiency of the organisation. This representative DOES NOT have the power to overrule or veto the other DIC member’s decisions without a formal snapshot vote.
A token Delegate is decided during the scheduled elections, but can be changed by snapshot vote at any time should the community wish it for whatever reason.
This role functions as a balance on incentives, a member who reliably has the interest and exposure of token holders in mind, and also someone who has an understanding of how decisions may impact the market and the community’s treasury. This serves to maintain a strong line of communication and alignment between the community and its contributors.
2.2.4§ DIC Elections
The DIC’s members, as well as all contributors and their total running costs, must be reviewed and renewed every two years in January. Representatives may be re-elected for multiple terms. This is done by token snapshot vote.
If the community wishes to replace more than 2 members in the DIC in one election period, then a one month grace period exists for handover of all resources and operations, where the previous DIC members may remain (in excess of 5) to complete necessary duties and explain processes to new members. This prevents a loss of information and direction between DIC iterations.
Election Process
Applications are submitted publicly, on the forums.
The DIC reviews applications and shortlists viable applicants. This prevents an attack on the DAO through voting in rogue DIC members.
The candidates are asked to have interviews with existing DIC members, as well as talk to the community about why they want to be part of the project.
For each spot, a DAO-wide Snapshot vote is made to choose from the shortlisted applicants.
2.2.5§ Removals
Representatives may be removed from the DIC at any time via token holder vote. Other internal policy changes must have a 4/5 agreement in the council, or otherwise be ratified by snapshot vote.
Any organisational structure required to operate efficiently and be productive is entirely at the discretion of the DIC and should not be dictated by a static writing.
2.3§ Multisig
The multisig consists of a community-elected council with delegated power to collectively administer the community treasury according to the will of the community.
The multisig is the core on-chain treasury of OTD. Security is of absolute importance and all members must adhere to strict procedures, outlined internally.
The main community treasury’s address is ownthedoge.eth (0x42565F5D8A3eFc5c80bb7aC0F8F646A82D4b434F).
The multisig consists of nine representatives. Term length is 48 months, unless a multisigner decides to resign or is removed by community vote. Any decision made by the multisig requires 6/9 representatives. If a multisig member is removed from the multisig, they must be immediately replaced in the same transaction with a new member. The threshold cannot be arbitrarily changed.
Any multisigner who cannot be contacted for a period of 3 months, is deemed malicious by 6 of the other members, or is otherwise compromised or unable to carry out their responsibility, must be immediately removed from the multisig.
There are other, usually smaller threshold multisigs in the organisation created out of necessity for different operations. These should never collectively hold the majority of the community’s funds, and should be governed by the same rules laid out here, with the exception of the threshold and number of signers. This is to enable efficient flow of operations. This must be handled with care to ensure there are no compromises, conflict of interest or other mistakes made that may lead to loss of control of the community’s funds.
2.3.1§ Multisig Representatives
Multisig representatives are trusted parties with a primary role to protect the community treasury. The multisig is made up of 9 community-elected representatives. The multisig must not consist of a majority from any one geographical jurisdiction.
2.3.2§ Approving Transactions
Multisig representatives must sign transactions sporadically. Each is responsible for identifying and eliminating incorrect or potentially fraudulent transactions before signing. 6/9 is the number of representatives needed to approve or reject a transaction. All transactions must have a well detailed written intention submitted to the communication channel when they are submitted. Members must be reasonably active, and must be able to be contacted through slack, which is where all transaction intentions will be communicated (this is true at the time of the publishing this document - this channel may be changed if the multisig or DIC deem it appropriate).
While the multisigners are intended to carry out the will of the DAO, they have emergency veto power in the scenario where they believe the DAO’s functions are being attacked. For example, if a user has bought enough tokens to force through a vote that either directly or indirectly gives them full power over the treasury, with malicious intent to distribute assets to themselves and to exclude the rest of the community, these transactions must be rejected and the matter settled otherwise.
2.3.3§ Multisig Elections
The multisig review happens every four years. Multisigners may be re-elected for multiple terms. This is done by token snapshot vote.
If the community wishes to replace more than 3 members in the multisig in one election period, then a two month stop gap exists before a further round of elections is initiated. This is needed to prevent a hostile takeover of the multisig.
Election Process
Applications are submitted publicly, on the forums.
The DIC reviews applications and shortlists viable applicants. This prevents an attack on the DAO through voting in rogue multisig members.
The candidates are asked to have interviews with existing DIC members, as well as talk to the community about why they want to be part of the project.
For each spot, a DAO-wide Snapshot vote is made to choose from the shortlisted applicants.
2.3.4§ Removals
Multisig representatives may be removed at any time via snapshot vote. Multisigners have no ability to affect decisions in their role as multisigners, with the exception of the emergency veto power.
Chapter 3 - Other Rules
3.1§ Constitutional Changes
Any changes to the Constitution must go through a formal snapshot vote, and the multisig must sign a message of approval for this action.
3.2§ Multisig and DIC Overlap
The Multisig must be majority international, and the majority of members must not also work in the DIC. All Multisig transactions must be executed by a non-US resident, unless in emergency.
3.3§ Charity
OTD aims to set a shining example for memecoin communities with its charitable donations and support of the meme’s creator, Atsuko. At least one percent of all revenue generated by the team’s activities (excluding token sales) must be donated to charity.